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A Mexican Perspective on the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Environment
Aureliano Gonzalez-Baz*
M exico, compared to Canada and the United States in matters of trade
and the environment, is in a somewhat different position. We must
go back in history and understand what has happened in Mexico in
scarcely ten, fifteen years.
With the advent of the Second World War, Mexico adopted an eco-
nomic model whereby it was going to close its doors to foreign imports
and was going to develop domestic industry in absolutely everything. As
a consequence, between 1941 and 1986, Mexico had a very limited manu-
facturing capability, with obsolete technology and very high prices.
In 1986, because of the financial problems that Mexico was facing
since the devaluations of 1976 and 1981, and because of the pressing need
to resolve those problems, Mexico recognized two things: (1) that if it
wanted to reduce inflation, it had to allow the importation of foreign
goods that were cheaper than Mexican-made goods; and (2) that it des-
perately needed foreign capital.
Mexico joined GATT, and in literally an overnight period, Mexican
manufacturers were faced with the fact that foreign products, which in
the past had averaged at a rate of 100 to 110 percent, suddenly had a
maximum of 20 percent and an average of 9.8 percent duty. Also,
ninety-eight percent of all products no longer required an import license.
In 1987, Mexico started growing, and we did renegotiate our foreign
debt. In 1989, we issued two very important pieces of legislation in Mex-
ico: the new foreign investment regulations and the new environmental
laws. Mexico had had environmental legislation since the early 1970s,
but such legislation was not as widespread or as complex, nor was it
intended to be as comprehensive, as that of 1989.
During the last week of 1990, in New York City, Dr. Jaime Serra
Puche, our Minister of Commerce for industrial development, together
with then Secretary Mosbacher publicly announced that neither the
United States nor Mexico wanted to form an economic block, and ac-
cordingly that it was not in the best interest of Mexico to form an eco-
nomic block. Dr. Serra Puche left New York and caught up with
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President Salinas in Germany, and two weeks later, they announced that
the United States and Mexico were to negotiate what is now the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").
It seems that what President Salinas was able to observe between
East and West Germany and in the Eastern Economic Block made him
change his mind. Suddenly, Salinas, who had been considered a very
aggressive and avant-garde president, was impressed as the changes were
taking place in East and West Germany with rapid speed.
In 1990, Mexico prepared itself and lived through the shock, from a
manufacturing point of view, of recognizing that it was going to have to
have a North American trade agreement. This did not mean that for-
eigners could not come to Mexico until NAFTA - because the 1989
Foreign Investment Regulations changed all that - but it did mean that
Mexican goods could not enter the United States on a competitive basis
until we had that agreement. This is the key reason why Mexico wanted
NAFTA. Mexico has predominantly tariff barriers with the United
States, whereas the United States has non-tariff barriers with which Mex-
ico must contend.
Mexico, which has no more than 600 companies that export prod-
ucts right now to the United States, was facing a very severe problem.
The accession to GATT effectively opened its doors. The 1989 regula-
tions effectively opened Mexico to foreigners more than ever. Suddenly,
Mexico had to find a way to become a manufacturing power very similar
to Taiwan, and this was the economic model for the government. If this
was to happen, products that import a great deal of components, the
manufacturing process and the value added are very significant. The
government wanted to make Mexico a big market. It started working
with the United States and began to learn that if you want to play the
game, you have to abide by the rules.
Now, not being part of the government, let me tell you what we feel
Mexico is facing right now. First of all, the government did a marvelous
job convincing everybody in Mexico, including those to be affected, that
NAFTA is a necessity.
The importation of goods into Mexico has unquestionably been a
major source of inflation reduction, which in 1987 was 162 percent, and
which last year came down to approximately 18 to 19 percent. We antic-
ipate it being in the fourteen to fifteen percent range this year. That same
economic change caused Mexico in 1991 to incur foreign debt of $110
billion and a deficit of 20 percent. In 1992, we are going to have debt
service.
President Salinas joined forces with President Bush last year, and
they started touring the United States. Salinas was faced with the fact
that in the United States, the president is one body, and Congress is an-
other. In Mexico, the president convinces the legislature. In the United
States, we believe that at times the legislature convinces the president.
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The fact that the President of the United States cannot unilaterally order
most everything is difficult to understand south of the border.
In any case, one U.S. congressman approached President Salinas
and said, "Mr. President, I'm well aware that you have environmental
laws, but I have to tell you that in my opinion, you do not apply environ-
mental law in Mexico." Let me stop at that point and go back a little bit
in history.
In 1976, Mexico had the first devaluation since 1941. The exchange
rate was 121/2 pesos for one U.S. dollar. We then had a devaluation from
121/2 pesos to 18 pesos per dollar. We in Mexico thought that was the
end of the world. Mexico definitely decided that the most important
thing was to find a way to cover the need and generate those 800,000 to
900,000 jobs a year into which we needed to channel people. Like most
countries in the process of development, we paid much greater attention
to jobs than the environment.
Yes, Mexico City was having environmental problems then, but the
country as a whole was not being inconvenienced. Yes, there were some
industries that were polluting, but they were providing an enormous
amount of revenue for the government, so they had to be assisted. Sud-
denly, in 1991, the President of Mexico recognized that without further
addressing the issues of environment, the U.S. Congress was not going to
approve NAFTA. The President of Mexico and his cabinet and advisors,
who were barely learning the rules of free trade and who were barely
negotiating the first significant trade agreement - we have others, but
this is the first significant trade agreement - suddenly found out that
they are going to have a shadow cabinet and that they must, on a parallel
basis, negotiate matters relating to labor and the environment. It is bene-
ficial to not make the environment one of the mainstream issues of trade,
but we have to recognize that the environment is not going to go away.
We in Mexico believe that double standards apply. We really can-
not say this publicly, but we believe that on one side, environmental is-
sues are very important. We believe, however, that Mexico is being
singled out on environmental issues, whereas the same environmental
constraints or requirements are not being placed upon other trading part-
ners of the United States who do not have trade agreements with the U.S.
That would be tantamount to implying that a Mexican manufacturer
could go to another country, which neither has a trade agreement with
the U.S. nor is in the process of negotiating one with the U.S., and would
be able to export that same product to the United States without having
to comply with environmental controls. This is so because Mexico is still
at the initial part of this trend, which is costing Mexico greatly in envi-
ronmental terms.
We will see the benefits in the future, but we have to be aware that it
is still costing us. We are trying to jump suddenly from 1969 to 1992,
and Mexico has internal and external problems.
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The first implication of this is that the U.S. Congress is effectively
meddling in Mexican politics, through restrictions and by putting pres-
sures on Mexico to sign the agreement. Congress is pressuring the
United States, which is in turn pressuring Mexico. That pressure is
something Mexico took many years to shake off, but Mexico must live
and cannot make a issue of it. This is a reality. The second implication
is that the Mexican Government will lose control of environmental mat-
ters. Instead of having the twenty, thirty or forty years that the United
States had to do something about the environment, the Mexican Govern-
ment must suddenly come into compliance without necessarily knowing
how such is to occur. This is something new for Mexico.
Finally, in a sense, Mexican statutes are very similar to those of the
United States. The reason is that we do not know how to reinvent them,
so we are trying to adopt a model that we feel has been most successful.
That in itself will have to go through various adaptations.
We know now that the implications of this are external and internal.
Externally, we have the U.S. Congress involved in Mexican political rela-
tions. That will affect jobs in Mexico and will mean that environmental
matters must become a top priority for the Mexican Government. This
might be in conflict with political reality. We do not know how this is
going to happen. Internally, we have local concerns that Mexico can no
longer claim to be a leader. A country of 1.9 million square miles and a
population of over 80 million people creates a serious problem for the
government to control. There is not enough money; there are not
enough people; and there is not enough technology available to take the
necessary measures. Also, environmental matters and issues and deci-
sions, as you know, are very complex.
We must also recognize that in Mexico, the political party now in
power has opposition and is actually losing elections. We have governors
from the opposition, like you have congressmen from the opposition. So,
at this point in time, the existing government has to make some very
hard decisions, which are going to be very unpopular, and they do not
know when to make them. Suddenly, international environmental mat-
ters have become political issues in Mexico.
Locally, people do not know how to react. Since 1987, we have been
following a very strange and difficult economic path, primarily intended
to abate inflation. As a consequence, the actual growth of the purchasing
power of the average Mexican has intentionally decreased significantly in
the last five years. If you are going to have to pay an extra price to buy a
commodity because it is environmentally safe, that is going to be infla-
tion, and how that inflation is going to deal with the risk price-wise is
something that we do not know.
What then is the Mexican Government facing? First, the govern-
ment is facing the fact that it must conclude a trade agreement. It is
committed to do so, again, for the reason that Mexican goods and serv-
ices must be able to enter the United States on terms far more competi-
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tive than those of the past. Second, the government must learn how to
deal with the United States Congress, and must learn to do so quickly.
Third, the government must recognize that there are going to be forces
outside the U.S. Government that are going to have a significant impact.
Finally, the government is trying to get the United States to buy certain
requirements of our goods and services, otherwise exported to the U.S.
from sources other than Canada or Mexico, if Mexico agrees on environ-
mental policies.
If we were to look back five or six years, we would see that Mexico
and the United States have signed three environmental agreements,
predominantly for the border area. I am convinced that the Mexican
Government felt those were going to be the full extent of its environmen-
tal negotiations with the United States. One of those agreements has not
been pushed by the United States, because it has to do with the Colorado
River and that would represent a substantial cost to the United States.
Nevertheless, those three agreements, which were considered very radi-
cal and important at the time, seem to have little significance when one
considers what Mexico must now do with the environment.
Let me go back to my story about what happened to President Sali-
nas in Washington when he was told by the congressman that Mexico
did not apply environmental laws. One week later, the first of ninety-
eight U.S. owned companies closed down in Mexico. Much publicity
was given to the closure, but the Mexican Government found out it could
take such action without being accused of being arbitrary, which was its
concern. The world press began to price the actions from the company
perspective. Suddenly, other companies started to comply, and the gov-
ernment has continued the process of closings.
Alternatively, under our current statutes, if SEDUE, which is the
Mexican EPA, were to levy a penalty, those funds would go to the mu-
nicipality and not to the federal government. If the law changes, and the
federal government gets the money, I bet it will start to levy penalties like
you cannot imagine.
On April 18, 1991, the anniversary of the exappropriation of the oil
industry in 1938, the President of Mexico made a fantastic decision. It
was decided that the refinery servicing Mexico City and areas north of
Mexico City, to which ten percent of the Mexico City pollution is attrib-
uted, would close at the end of that day, thereby displacing 5,000 em-
ployees. It is costing Mexico $650 million to rebuild and adapt other
refineries in order to supply what Mexico needs. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment did close it down, and the president received much press atten-
tion. So, suddenly in Mexico, where we have not one technical school or
graduate school that teaches one course in ecology, we are faced with
meeting the developer of environmental technology.
I tend to believe that this should not be construed as having de-
clared war against the United States. We Mexicans figure that we shall
never win a war against the United States. We see Japan and Germany,
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and we want to lose a war as they did. We do not want to lose as bad as
Japan, but want just one-tenth of Japan's loss and one-tenth of Ger-
many's. Give us a Sherman Program as well.
We feel now that we can come to the United States and Canada and
say, "Okay, if I am willing to adapt and play by your rules, let's do the
following."
First, make all other people - all other countries - that export
goods to the United States, Canada or Mexico have the same require-
ments. We should all play by the same rules, which very neatly fall into
the guidelines of GATT, but which would not necessarily allow many
countries to continue their exports to the United States.
Second, we must find a way to help Mexico fix its problems inter-
nally so that it does not become a model of a country that produces eco-
logical goods for exportation, but does not have a sound ecological
environment. Mexico does not have a multitude of agreements, regula-
tions and decisions - the technical norms that the United States has.
We do not have Superfund. As a lawyer, I regret that. It would be the
1992 Relief Act Award. Mexico has not had the negative experience that
the U.S. has had. That is not to say that if we look, we are not going find
it. We are now convinced that if we would start looking at our internal
situation, we are going to find something very negative; we are going to
open up Pandora's Box, and this is where the opportunity will lie.
In Canada and the United States, you have a history now of "envi-
ronment". Suddenly, due to Mexico, environment and trade come hand
in hand. Mexico does not have the experience and training. It has very
sketchy and very simple experience in dealing with the environment, but
Mexico is a very willing, learning partner. We believe that if Mexico is to
be successful in its efforts, we will have to learn how to handle the multi-
tude of regulations of the United States, Canada and European countries
in such a way that will not kill Mexican manufacturing concerns, but will
allow us to be competitive and capable of resolving our internal
problems. This is something for which you and the generations to come
in the United States, Canada and Mexico are going to have to work to-
gether to resolve.
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